Probabilistic Model-Based Diagnosis: An Electrical Power System Case Study

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Abstract-We present in this article a case study of the probabilistic approach to model-based diagnosis. Here, the diagnosed system is a real-world electrical power system, namely the Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostic Testbed (ADAPT) located at the NASA Ames Research Center. Our probabilistic approach is formally well-founded, and based on Bayesian networks and arithmetic circuits. We pay special attention to meeting two of the main challenges — model development and real-time reasoning - often associated with real-world application of model-based diagnosis technologies. To address the challenge of model development, we develop a systematic approach to representing electrical power systems as Bayesian networks, supported by an easy-touse specification language. To address the real-time reasoning challenge, we compile Bayesian networks into arithmetic circuits. Arithmetic circuit evaluation supports real-time diagnosis by being predictable and fast. In experiments with the ADAPT Bayesian network, which contains 503 discrete nodes and 579 edges and produces accurate results, the time taken to compute the most probable explanation using arithmetic circuits has a mean of 0.2625 milliseconds and a standard deviation of 0.2028 milliseconds. In comparative experiments, we found that while the variable elimination and join tree propagation algorithms also perform very well in the ADAPT setting, arithmetic circuit evaluation was an order of magnitude or more faster.

Index Terms—Bayesian networks, arithmetic circuits, uncertainty; model-based diagnosis; knowledge engineering; electrical power systems; aerospace; real-time systems; domain modelling.

I. INTRODUCTION

I N this paper, we apply probabilistic model-based diagnosis techniques to a real-world electrical power system (EPS), namely the Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostic Testbed (ADAPT) [1]. In this application, a Bayesian network (BN) model [2] of the ADAPT electrical power system plays a

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Serdar Uckun is with the Embedded Reasoning Area at the Palo Alto Research Center, 3333 Coyote Hill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304; email: Serdar.Uckun@parc.com. This work was performed while he was at NASA. central role. The ADAPT BN represents health of sensors and subsystem components explicitly, and is auto-generated from a high-level system model of the ADAPT EPS. This BN is then compiled, off-line, into an arithmetic circuit which is then evaluated on-line. We believe that this ADAPT case study clearly demonstrates how arithmetic circuits offer a scalable inference technique with potential for real-time evaluation in aircraft and spacecraft.

Several aspects of this work make it different from previous efforts that utilize Bayesian networks for EPS diagnosis [3], [4]: A first contribution is our expression of EPS components and structure, using a novel high-level language, coupled with auto-generation of Bayesian networks from models expressed in this language. This approach supports the iterative development of probabilistic diagnostic models for large EPSs, including diagnostic system models that would be extremely tedious to hand-construct even for Bayesian network experts. The benefit of this approach to developers and engineers that are not, or only vaguely, familiar with Bayesian network appears to be even greater.

It is important to achieve real-time performance in many EPS health monitoring applications in aerospace [5], [6]. As a second contribution, we would like to highlight our compilation approach to probabilistic diagnosis, specifically the off-line compilation of Bayesian networks to arithmetic circuits [7], [8], which are then used for on-line diagnosis. An arithmetic circuit, which typically is large but has simple a semantics, supports real-time diagnosis on-line in the following two ways. First, it results in more predictable times. Second, it results in much faster inference. These two benefits are important to us, given the real-time requirements of aircraft and spacecraft avionics [6]. In experiments, we have here successfully shown that this approach provides high-quality diagnostic results on ADAPT scenarios. In addition, we have shown that performance is substantially better than alternative probabilistic inference algorithms, specifically variable elimination and clique (or join) tree propagation.

Electrical power systems are of crucial importance in aerospace as well as in numerous other areas of society [9], [1]. Our results in this article provide an argument for the feasibility of probabilistic, model-based diagnosis of EPSs. One of our main contributions is the integration of different techniques, both existing and novel, in order to address a real world problem, thereby obtaining an approach that scales up to handle real world challenges in probabilistic modelbased diagnosis. Building on the approach discussed here, we have developed BNs that achieved the best overall scores in the Industrial Track of the 2009 DX Challenge Competition [10]. In addition, we have demonstrated scalability for BNs representing 24 distinct EPSs, where the largest BN had 1,018 nodes and 1,194 edges [11].

The rest of this article is structured as follows. We discuss electrical power systems in aerospace, the ADAPT testbed, and diagnostic challenges in Section II. We then briefly introduce fundamentals of Bayesian networks and arithmetic circuits in Section III. Using ADAPT as a case study, we discuss the high level specification language (Section IV), Bayesian network modelling and auto-generation (Section V and Section VI respectively), and compilation to arithmetic circuits (Section VII). Finally, we report on experimental results in Section VIII, both on real-world and synthetic data, before concluding in Section IX.

II. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

We consider the importance of electrical power systems (EPSs) in aerospace, describe an EPS testbed that is the subject of this case study, and discuss diagnostic challenges associated with EPSs.

A. Challenges in Aerospace and at NASA

The essential role that electrical power systems (EPSs) play in aerospace vehicles is well-known [9], [1]. The electrical power system may be thought of as the circulatory system of an aerospace vehicle. In the human body, the circulatory system delivers oxygen and removes carbon dioxide. Similarly, the EPS delivers energy to subsystems in order to power required vehicle functions such as life support, propulsion, communications, guidance, navigation, and control. Loss of electrical power to these and similar subsystems can result in severe repercussions for the vehicle, personnel, or mission.

Unfortunately, electrical power systems have been implicated in several aerospace vehicle incidents, accidents and mishaps. In one accident, the left Power Conversion and Distribution Unit (PCDU) on a Boeing 717 failed, resulting in the loss of the left AC and DC busses. The most likely cause was determined to be the failure of a transient suppression diode, which allowed AC current to contaminate the DC circuits of the PCDU. In another incident involving the PCDU of a Boeing 717, a tantalum capacitor and a permanent magnet generator input transformer failed, resulting in smoke in the cabin and an emergency landing and evacuation (NTSB report ATL04IA085). The Electric Propulsion Space Experiment (ESEX) mission, launched and operated in early 1999, ended prematurely when the spacecraft experienced a catastrophic battery failure. The failure was most likely the result of electrolyte leakage which caused a short circuit to the battery case, resulting in a breach of the battery case, entry of super-heated gas into the flight unit, and eventual venting into space [12]. On January 14 2005, an Intelsat operated communications satellite suffered a total loss after a sudden and unexpected electrical power system anomaly. The failure of Intelsat 804's high voltage power system was likely the result of a high current event in the battery circuitry triggered by an electrostatic discharge (see http://sat-nd.com/failures/index.html/). A battery failure also occurred on the Mars Global Surveyor,




Fig. 1. Schematic of the ADAPT testbed, showing one of three power storage parts (for Battery 1, top) and one of two load banks (Load bank 1, bottom). Detailed information about loads is given in Table II.

which last communicated with Earth on November 2, 2006. A software error oriented the spacecraft to an angle that exposed it to too much sunlight. This caused the battery to overheat and ultimately led to the depletion of both batteries (see http://mpfwww.jpl.nasa.gov/mgs/newsroom/20070413a.html).

These are just a few examples of the faults that can arise in EPSs. Given the prevalence and importance of EPSs, it is vital to develop effective health management approaches, including diagnostic techniques, for real-time operation in aerospace vehicles.

B. The Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostic Testbed

We now turn to the Advanced Diagnostics and Prognostics Testbed (ADAPT); see also http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/adapt/ and [1]. ADAPT, which has capabilities for power generation, power storage, and power distribution, is a fully operational electrical power system that is representative of such systems in aircraft and spacecraft. Figure 1 presents a schematic with a representative battery and load bank from ADAPT. ADAPT is configured to achieve fault-tolerance, and contains three batteries and two load banks. One battery can provide power to two load banks. However, two batteries may not be connected to the same load bank. In Figure 1, for example, for Battery 1 to power Load bank 2, on the other hand, relay

Part	Prefix	Mode (Healthy/Faulty)	States	
Battery	BATT	Healthy	healthy	
		Voltage failure or drain	stuckDisabled	
Circuit	ISH	Healthy	healthy	
breaker		Stuck or failed open	stuckOpen	
		Stuck or failed closed	stuckClosed	
Inverter	INV	Healthy	healthy	
		Switched off	stuckOpen	
Relay	EY	Healthy	healthy	
_		Stuck or failed open	stuckOpen	
		Stuck or failed closed	stuckClosed	
Voltage	EI	Healthy	healthy	
sensor		Reading stuck low	readVoltageLo	
		Reading stuck high	readVoltageHi	
Current	IT	Healthy	healthy	
sensor		Reading stuck low	readCurrentLo	
		Reading stuck high	readCurrentHi	
Position	ISH	Healthy	healthy	
sensor		Reading stuck open	stuckOpen	
		Reading stuck closed	stuckClosed	

TABLE I DIFFERENT EPS PARTS ALONG WITH THEIR MODES AND THE CORRESPONDING STATES OF THE HEALTH NODE FOR THE PART.

EY144 is closed. Relays EY141 and EY144 cannot both be closed at the same time.

Different types of components and sensors used in ADAPT are presented in Table I. Relays, which are commanded to close and open to control power, have prefix EY (in Figure 1) and health modes as indicated in the table. A position sensor, also presented in Table I, reports on the status of a relay. As concrete examples, consider in Figure 1 relay EY170 that controls power to load L1A; it also has a position (or touch) sensor ESH170. Our probabilistic diagnostic application works on real-world data from ADAPT. In our application, each of EY170 and ESH170 are represented by random variables including health status random variables with states as represented in Table I. For example, EY170's health random variable has states {healthy, stuckOpen, stuckClosed}. Upstream of relav EY170 is a current sensor IT167: the states of its health variable are *{healthy, readCurrentLo, readCurrentHi*} as shown in the table. Further information on our probabilistic modelling of EPS components and structure is provided in Section V and Section VI.

There are two load banks in ADAPT, each has an AC part and a DC part. Load bank 2 is very similar to Load bank 1, the loads are just plugged into different locations. Each load is connected at a fixed place in the power distribution unit. In other words, there is no ambiguity as to which "power outlet" a load is "plugged into". At this time, there are mostly AC loads in ADAPT; see Table II. Currently there are 2 DC loads, one for each load bank. To convert DC power from the batteries into AC power used by the AC loads, ADAPT has two inverters, one per load bank. A failed inverter breaks power transmission to the AC loads; see the *stuckOpen* failure mode in Table I.

C. Diagnostic Challenges

There are several diagnostic challenges associated with EPSs including ADAPT. First, they often have a large number of distinct modes due to mode-inducing components such as None

N/A

Temperature (TE511)

N/A TABLE II

LGT4

DC1

Loads and their sensors (where applicable) for Load bank 1 of the ADAPT electrical power system.

relays, circuit breakers, and loads. If an EPS has m such components, and we conservatively assume 2 discrete states for each, there are potentially 2^m modes in the EPS. Second, while much EPS behavior is deterministic, there is both sensor noise and system state uncertainty in EPSs. Sensor noise is due to the imperfections of sensing, while system state uncertainty is due to failures of EPS components and sensors. Third, the mode switching behavior of EPSs often induces transients in system response and the corresponding sensor measurements. which may lead to false alarms if simple threshold-based monitoring is used. Fourth, the time evolution of faults can have a wide range of time scales depending on the fault mechanism; switch faults will manifest very quickly while degradation in a power source could take place over days or weeks. Our use of Bayesian networks and arithmetic circuits, as discussed in this article, is motivated by the need to construct EPS diagnostic models that capture both deterministic and uncertain behavior when many modes are present.

III. BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND ARITHMETIC CIRCUITS

We now briefly present the underlying formalisms of our probabilistic model-based reasoning approach: Bayesian networks and arithmetic circuits.

A. Bayesian Networks

ID

L1A

L1B

L1C

L1D

L1E

L1F

L1G

L1H

Relay

EY170

EY171

EY172

EY173

EY174

EY175

EY183

EY184

1 light bulb

Electromech.

None

Bayesian networks (BNs) represent multivariate probability distributions and are used for reasoning and learning under uncertainty [2]. Probability theory and graph theory form the basis of BNs: Roughly speaking, random variables are represented as nodes in a directed acyclic graph (DAG), while conditional dependencies are represented as graph edges. A key point is that a BN, whose graph structure often reflects a domain's causal structure, is a compact representation of a joint probability table if its graph is relatively sparse. Both discrete and continuous random variables can be represented in BNs; our main emphasis in this article is on BNs with discrete random variables. Each discrete random variable (or node) X has a finite number of states $\{x_1, \ldots x_m\}$ and is parameterized by a conditional probability table (CPT).

Let X be the BN nodes, $E \subset X$ the evidence nodes, and e the evidence. Different probabilistic queries can now be formulated; they all assume that all nodes in E are clamped to values e. Computation of most probable explanation (MPE)

amounts to finding a most probable explanation over the remaining nodes $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{X} - \mathbf{E}$, or MPE(e). Computation of marginals (or beliefs) amounts to inferring the posterior probabilities over one or more query nodes $Q \subseteq R$, specifically BEL(Q, e) where $Q \in Q$. Marginals are used to compute most likely values (MLVs) simply by picking, in BEL(Q, e), a most likely state. Computation of the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) generalizes MPE computation and finds a most probable instantiation over nodes $Q \subseteq R$, MAP(Q, e). MAP can be approximated by MPE and MLV, and we will denote this using MAP_{MPE}(Q, e) and MAP_{MLV}(Q, e) respectively. $MAP_{MPE}(Q, e)$ is the result of disregarding the nodes in **R** not in **Q**, and MAP_{MLV}(Q, e) is the result of aggregating MLV(Q, e) of all $Q \in Q$. These two approximations are of interest because of the greater computational complexity of MAP [13] compared to MPE and marginals [14], [15].

Different BN inference algorithms can be used to perform the above computations. We distinguish between exact and inexact algorithms, and focus in this article on exact algorithms, which include join tree propagation [16], [17], [18], conditioning [19], [20], variable elimination [21], [22], and arithmetic circuit evaluation [7], [8]. In resource-bounded systems, including real-time avionics systems, there is a strong need to align the resource consumption of diagnostic computation with resource bounds [5], [6]. The compilation approach—including join tree propagation and arithmetic circuit evaluation—is attractive in resource-bounded systems. In this article we emphasize compilation into arithmetic circuits, which we present next.


B. Arithmetic Circuits

Arithmetic circuits (ACs), as discussed in [23], [7], are here used to perform probabilistic inference. The compilation from BNs to ACs is based on the following connection between BNs and multi-linear functions. With each Bayesian network, we associate a corresponding multi-linear function (MLF) that computes the probability of evidence. For example, the BN $A \rightarrow C \leftarrow B$, where A and B are Boolean and C has three values, induces the following MLF:

$$\lambda_{a_1}\lambda_{b_1}\lambda_{c_1}\theta_{a_1}\theta_{b_1}\theta_{c_1|a_1,b_1} + \lambda_{a_1}\lambda_{b_1}\lambda_{c_2}\theta_{a_1}\theta_{b_1}\theta_{c_2|a_1,b_1} + \cdots \\ + \lambda_{a_2}\lambda_{b_2}\lambda_{c_2}\theta_{a_2}\theta_{b_2}\theta_{c_2|a_2,b_2} + \lambda_{a_2}\lambda_{b_2}\lambda_{c_3}\theta_{a_2}\theta_{b_2}\theta_{c_3|a_2,b_2}.$$

The terms in the MLF are in one-to-one correspondence with the rows of the network's joint distribution. Assume that all *indicator variables* λ_x have value 1 and all *parameter* variables $\theta_{x|u}$ have value $\Pr(x|u)$. Each term will then be a product of probabilities which evaluates to the probability of the corresponding row from the joint. The MLF will add all probabilities from the joint, for a sum of 1.0. To compute the probability $\Pr(e)$ of evidence e, we need a way to exclude certain terms from the sum. This removal of terms is accomplished by carefully setting certain indicators to 0 instead of 1, according to the evidence.

Unfortunately, the network MLF has exponential size. However, if we can factor the MLF into something small enough to fit within memory, then we can compute Pr(e) in time that is linear in the size of the factorization. The factorization



THE SYNTAX OF OUR NOVEL SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE.

will take the form of an AC, which is a rooted DAG, where an internal node represents the sum or product of its children, and a leaf represents a constant or variable. In this context, those variables will be indicator and parameter variables. We refer to this process of producing an AC from a BN as *compiling* the network. While a BN is more compact than an AC, there are in fact several advantages associated with using an AC for probabilistic inference, as we will discuss shortly.

Once we have an AC for a network, we can compute Pr(e)for given evidence e by assigning appropriate values to leaves and then computing a value for each internal node in bottomup fashion. The value for the root is then the answer to the query. We can also compute answers to many other queries (a posterior marginal for each network variable, a posterior marginal for each network family, etc.) by performing a second downward pass [7] analogous to the outward pass of the join tree algorithm. Hence, many queries can be computed simultaneously in time linear in the size of the AC. MPE(e) may be computed in a similar manner, by using maximization nodes instead of addition nodes in the AC. Another main point is that the upward and downward passes may then be repeated for as many evidence sets as desired, without recompiling. Performing inference using an AC is therefore divided into two phases, an offline phase, which compiles the network into an AC and is run once, and an online phase, which answers many queries each time it is invoked, and which may be invoked multiple times.

We close this section by noting the close relationship between the join tree algorithm [16], [17] and ACs, since the data structures involved in this algorithm embed an AC in a very precise sense [24]. Other compilation algorithms have been developed based on tabular elimination [23], weighted model counting [25], and ADD elimination [8]. These algorithms can have an exponential advantage over join tree by exploiting structure in the parameters of the Bayesian network [26].

IV. HIGH LEVEL MODEL

Our approach to probabilistic model-based diagnosis involves four stages. In the first stage, we describe the EPS using a high-level modeling language. In the second stage, we apply a program to automatically convert the high-level specification into a Bayesian network. Putting the EPS model into the form of a Bayesian network allows us to leverage a large body of existing work on inference techniques. In the third stage, we compile the Bayesian network into an arithmetic circuit. This stage represents the application of a specific technique




Fig. 2. A small electrical power system; it is described using our specification language in Table IV.

source :	0.0001 ;	
wire :	0.0000 :	batt ;
sensorCurrent :	0.0003 :	wire1 ;
relav :	0.0003 :	wire1;
		rly ;
		rly;
		wire2 ;
		wire2;
	wire :	wire : 0.0000 : sensorCurrent : 0.0003 : relay : 0.0003 : sensorTouch : 0.0002 : wire : 0.0000 : sensorVoltage : 0.0002 :

TABLE IV A SMALL EPS, SHOWN IN FIGURE 2, DESCRIBED USING OUR SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE.

(arithmetic circuits) for performing inference in Bayesian networks, which in the resource-bounded, real-time context has significant advantages over other techniques [5], [6]. All stages up to this point have taken place offline, before the EPS is put into actual use. The fourth stage involves applying algorithms to the arithmetic circuit to perform inference online, when the EPS is in the field. By this time, as much computational effort as possible has been performed offline, leaving much less computation to be performed online. In this and the next four sections, we provide more detail on each stage, beginning in this section with the novel high-level specification language.

The syntax of our high-level specification language is given in Table III. A specification is a list of statements. (Here, <name> is an identifier, and <p> is a probability.) Each statement defines a component, which can either be a source (battery), a basic component, a sensor, or a sink (load). For brevity, we do not describe here some statements defining more complicated sensors. The general idea is that power flows from sources through basic components to sinks, monitored by sensors, and various failures can occur at each component. For each component, we define its name, its type (e.g., source, load, breaker, relay, sensorCurrent, sensorVoltage), the probability that the component will fail,¹ and a set of neighboring components. For a source, the set of neighbors is empty; for a basic component or a sink, we list all neighbors that lie between the component and a source of electricity; for a sensor, we list only the component to which the sensor is attached. These sets of neighbors serve to define the topology of an EPS.

Figure 2 depicts a very simple example of an electrical power system, which is also described in Table IV by means of our specification language. The third line, for example, defines a current sensor curSens with failure probability 0.0003 and attached to component wire1 (which happens to be a wire defined in the second line); and the fifth line defines a touch (or position) sensor touchSens with failure probability 0.0002 and attached to the relay rly.

Using our specification language, the ADAPT EPS is described using statements for the following components: 3 sources (batteries), 20 sinks (loads), 16 wires (we only need to describe a wire if it has a sensor attached or if we want to model failures in wires), 2 inverters, 9 circuit breakers, 25 relays, 17 current and load sensors, 16 voltage sensors, 33 position (touch) sensors, and 6 more advanced sensors (these advanced sensors are not described here for sake of brevity).

The main purpose of the high–level specification language is to make developing an EPS model easy and less error– prone. One can specify a model by listing which components exist in the system, and for each, its type, failure probability, and neighbors. All of this information can often be obtained directly from schematics and hardware manuals. Consequently, the modeling task at the specification language level does not require guesswork or any knowledge of Bayesian networks or arithmetic circuits.

Components differ from each other in some ways that are not represented explicitly in the specification language, because the information can be inferred from the component's type. For example, some component types, such as a circuit– breaker, accept a command to open or close, whereas some, such as a wire, do not. Similarly, different components may suffer different types of failures as presented in Table I. For example, a wire can only fail in a stuck–open state, whereas a circuit breaker can be stuck–open or stuck–closed. This information is added during the BN auto-generation stage (see Section VI), reflecting our BN modelling approach, which is what we discuss next.

V. MODELLING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

A main contribution in this work is our systematic modelling of EPSs using BNs. BNs provide a probabilistic semantics for our high-level specification language, and in addition they support efficient inference including compilation into arithmetic circuits. We partition the set of BN nodes X into subsets H, E, C, P and R as follows:

- Health nodes (*H*), where *H* = *H*_C∪ *H*_S and *H*_C ∩ *H*_S = Ø. Here, *H*_C (component health nodes) represent health of the EPS components and *H*_S (sensor health nodes) represent the health of the EPS sensors.
- Evidence nodes (*E*), where $E = E_C \cup E_S$ and $E_C \cap E_S = \emptyset$. Here, E_C (command nodes) represent the commands to the EPS, while E_S (sensor reading nodes) represent sensor readings from the EPS.
- Connection nodes (C), where $C = C_R \cup C_K$ and $C_R \cap C_K = \emptyset$. Here, C_R (source connection nodes) represent connection to a source (battery) in an EPS; C_K (sink connection nodes) represent connection to a sink (load) in an EPS.
- Presence nodes (**P**), where $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{P}_C \cup \mathbf{P}_V$ and $\mathbf{P}_C \cap \mathbf{P}_V = \emptyset$. Here, \mathbf{P}_V (voltage presence nodes) represent voltage, similar to water pressure, provided by a source (battery) in an EPS. \mathbf{P}_C (current propagation or presence

¹As described, all failures for a given component have equal probability, but the syntax can easily be extended to assign differing probabilities to different kinds of failures.




TABLE V

BN (LEFT) AND MPE COMPUTATION USING THE NETWORK (RIGHT) FOR THE SMALL EPS SPECIFIED IN TABLE IV. IN THE BN WE SHOW BOTH THE NODE NAMES (*Health_batt, Health_ld, ...*) AND THE NOTATION ($C_h, C_d, ...$) USED TO DESCRIBE THE AUTO-GENERATION ALGORITHM.

nodes) represent flow, similar to water flow, of electrical current from a source (battery) to a sink (load) in an EPS. In our case, there is presence of voltage iff there is a closed connection to one or more batteries, therefore one may work with either C_R or P_V .

• Remaining EPS nodes (\mathbf{R}): Nodes that are not health, evidence, connection, or presence nodes. If \mathbf{X} is the set of all BN nodes, then $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{X} - \mathbf{H} - \mathbf{E} - \mathbf{C} - \mathbf{P}$.

The above node partitioning allows us to state different probabilistic queries of interest; discuss our EPS modelling approach using BNs (both the topology as well as the individual nodes associated with different EPS components); and clearly present the experimental protocol.

In Section III we discussed, given query variables $Q \subseteq X$ and evidence e, three probabilistic queries: MAP(Q, e), MAP_{MPE}(Q, e), and MAP_{MLV}(Q, e). By introducing the above partitioning, we can put $Q = H_C$, $Q = H_S$, or Q = H and obtain a total of nine different diagnostics queries. As an example, $Q = H_S$ is of interest in sensor validation, where the main focus is on qualifying and disqualifying sensors [27], for instance voltage sensors, current sensors, fuel sensors, or altitude sensors. In the rest of this article we emphasize Q = H and in particular MAP_{MPE}(H, e).

A key contribution in this work is our modeling of EPSs using Bayesian networks. An EPS presents two different but closely related problems, namely a voltage presence problem and a current flow problem. Voltage may propagate from a battery towards the loads. For current to flow, there must be voltage present and in addition the EPS circuit needs to be closed, which typically happens when an EPS load is turned on and all other relays between the load and a battery are also closed. This bidirectional voltage-current propagation problem is different from, and more complicated than, the unidirectional flow problem posed by digital circuits implementing boolean logic. Such digital electronic circuits have been extensively studied in the model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network literature [2].

Table V provides a simple example of our EPS modelling approach. This BN was auto-generated, as discussed in Section VI, from the specification in Table

IV. Here, $H_C = \{\text{Health batt, Health ld}\}$ and $H_S =$ {*Health curSens*, *Health voltSens, Health touchSens*}; $\mathbf{E}_{C} = \{Command \ relay\}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{S} = \{Sensor \ curSens,$ Sensor voltSens, Sensor touchSens}. The topology of the ADAPT BN, which currently contains over 500 nodes, is analogous to this BN's topology. A key point in this example is how the integration of voltage presence nodes (P_V = {Voltage batt, Voltage wire1, Voltage rly, Voltage wire2}), sink connection nodes ($C_K = \{ToSink_wire1, ToSink_rly,$ ToSink wire2, ToSink ld}), and the current flow node (P_C = {*Current wire1*}) help solve the problems of voltage presence and current flow identified above. Many nodes, including current flow nodes, can be pruned (and indeed have been here) because they are leaf nodes and not involved in sensors. Another key point is how sensors, for example the voltage sensor (nodes Health voltSens, Sensor voltSens) and the current sensor (nodes Health curSens, Sensor curSens), are integrated into the overall BN topology.

We now consider inference as illustrated in Table V. Suppose that $e = \{Command_rly = cmdClose, Sensor_curSens = readCurrentLo, Sensor_voltSens = readVoltageHi, Sensor_touchSens = readClosed\}$. This gives MAP_{MPE}(H, e) = $\{Health_batt = healthy, Health_ld = healthy, Health_curSens = stuckCurrentLo, Health_voltSens = healthy}\}$. In words, if the command and sensor readings, except for Sensor_curSens = readCurrentLo, suggest that power is supplied to the load, then the MPE diagnosis is that all components and sensors are healthy, except for the current sensor, where Health_curSens = stuckCurrentLo. It is reassuring that there is agreement between the MPE diagnosis and common sense in this case.

While our modelling approach, as discussed above, can be used when manually constructing BNs for EPSs and similar systems, it is even more powerful when automated, and we now turn to how we have formalized it in an auto-generation algorithm.

VI. AUTO-GENERATION OF BAYESIAN NETWORK

In this section, we discuss how a BN is auto-generated from a high-level specification model. This is the second stage in our approach to probabilistic model-based diagnosis. The




Fig. 3. The part of the BN corresponding to (a) a relay and (b) a current sensor.

conversion runs in a loop, which processes one component from the specification in each iteration. Such a sequential order is guaranteed to exist under the assumption that the underlying EPS can be described using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). There is a clear mapping from a high-level specification to a DAG: In each component statement (see Table III), the first <name> represents a node, and the <name>+ part represents its parents (assuming this is not a source statement in the specification, which is trivial since it is a root node in the DAG). Under the assumption that there exists such a DAG, there exists a sequential high-level specification, since it is well-known from graph theory that any DAG can be topologically (or sequentially) sorted.

The auto-generation algorithm can now be summarized as follows: We iterate over the components in the specification and for each generate a set of BN nodes and a set of BN edges. Each time the algorithm creates a BN node for a component, it places the node into the appropriate set among H_C , H_S , E_C , E_S , C_R , C_K , P_C , P_V , and R, as we illustrate below.

The processing of a sensor is somewhat different from the processing of other components, so we treat sensors separately, after first discussing other components. As an example, Figure 3(a) depicts the part of a BN corresponding to a relay C. For the component C, the auto-generation algorithm generates six nodes in the BN:

- A component health node $C_h \in H_C$, with values {healthy, stuckOpen, stuckClosed}, indicates C's health state. C_h has a CPT set according to C's failure probability as defined in the high-level specification.
- A command node $C_m \in E_C$, with values {*cmdOpen*, *cmdClose*}, indicates the command being sent to the relay. This value will always be known prior to inference, since it is set according to the command being issued to the relay. Therefore, probabilities in this CPT are not important; C_m has a uniform CPT.
- A remaining node $C_d \in \mathbf{R}$, with values {open, closed}, indicates whether C is currently closed. If $C_h = healthy$, then C_d indicates closed iff $C_m = cmdClose$. Otherwise, if C_h is stuckOpen (stuckClosed), then C_d indicates open (closed).
- A source connection node C_r ∈ C_R, with values {open, closed}, indicates whether there is a closed path from C to a battery (source). C_r = closed iff C_d = closed

 $\wedge \vee_N [N_r = closed]$ where N iterates over all of C's upstream neighbors².

- A sink connection node C_k ∈ C_K, with values {open, closed}, indicates whether there is a closed path from C to a load (sink). C_k = closed iff C_d = closed ∧∨_N [N_k = closed] where N iterates over all of C's downstream neighbors.
- A current presence node $C_c \in \mathbf{P}_C$, with values {*currentLo*, *currentHi*}, indicates whether current is flowing through C. $C_c = currentHi$ iff $C_r = closed$ and $C_k = closed$.

For C_r and C_k , the disjunction is cascaded to prevent the CPT from becoming too large. This same template applies to all non-sensor components with a few minor modifications. For example, a source can set C_r to be equivalent to C_d ; a sink can set C_k to be equivalent to C_d ; a wire, which does not accept commands, will always set C_m to *cmdClosed* (or omit C_m from the model); and different component types may have different types of failures.

Figure 3(b) depicts the part of the BN corresponding to a current sensor S, which is attached to a node such as C_c of a component C. The auto-generation algorithm creates two nodes in the BN corresponding to S:

- A sensor health node S_h ∈ H_S, with values {healthy, stuckCurrentLo, stuckCurrentHi}, indicates S's health state. S_h has a CPT set according to S's failure probability as defined in the high–level specification.
- A sensor reading node S_s ∈ E_S, with values {read-CurrentLo, readCurrentHi}, indicates S's two-state discretized sensor reading. If S_h = healthy, then S_s indicates closed iff C_c = currentHi. Otherwise, if S_h is stuckCurrentLo (stuckCurrentHi), then S_s indicates readCurrentLo (readCurrentHi).

This same template applies to all sensor components (except some more complicated sensors, which are beyond the scope of this work) with a few minor modifications. For example, different sensors are attached to different nodes in C: current sensors are attached to C_c , voltage sensors are attached to C_r , while touch sensors are attached to C_d .

After the BN generation step discussed above, there is a BN pruning step. Pruning takes place based on information about query nodes (H_C and H_S) as well as about evidence nodes (E_C and E_S). A common pruning technique involves removing leaf nodes that are not part of the evidence ($E_C \cup E_S$) or the query (H_C , H_S , or $H_C \cup H_S$) [28]. In Table V, some of the nodes have been pruned compared to Figure 3(a). Specifically, nodes corresponding to C_r , C_k , and C_c are pruned in Table V. In other words, for the relay shown in Table V we have the following correspondence with the non-pruned nodes in Figure 3(a): $C_h = Health_rly$, $C_m = Command_rly$, $C_d = Closed_rly$. How can we determine to prune C_r , C_k , and C_c (referring to Figure 3(a)), but not prune $S_s = Sensor_curSens$ and $S_h = Health_curSens$ (referring to Figure 3(b) and Table V)? Here, $S_s = Sensor_curSens$ is a vari-

²A neighbor of C is upstream of C if it is located between C and a source in the high-level specification. A neighbor of C is downstream of C if it is located between C and a sink in the high-level specification.

able for which we assert evidence, while $S_h = Health_curSens$ is a query variable. Evidence and query variables are never pruned. We only prune non-evidence, non-query variables that are leaves, or which become leaves as a result of other pruning. Consequently, all of C's nodes are pruned except the following: $C_h = Health_rly$ which is a query variable; C_m = Command_rly which is an evidence variable; and $C_d = Closed_rly$ which is neither, but it cannot be pruned in this case, because it has descendent that is an evidence variable, namely the touch sensor variable Sensor touchSens.

A few assumptions have been made in our BN-generation approach. First, the approach assumes that a model can be expressed as a DAG, since BNs are restricted to DAGs. Second, we do not model dynamic behavior (as induced, for example, by capacitors or inductors) in the BN at this stage. Third, continuous sensor values are currently discretized into a small (from two to four) number of states. The number of states could relatively easily be increased or one could use soft evidence, and we are in fact exploring more fine-grained discretizations in on-going research.

Our work is similar to existing work on constructing layered Bayesian networks with Noisy-MAX CPTs [29], [30]. For example, our component models are layered with a small number of layers as illustrated in Figure 3. The justification for our and similar research is the following. Even though existing WYSIWYG BN modeling tools, such as GENIE, HUGIN, and SAMIAM, are user friendly and intuitive to use, it still takes a substantial effort and expertise to create BNs with hundreds or thousands of nodes. By introducing certain assumptions, as reflected in Section IV and Section V, the effort and level of expertise required to develop large-scale BNs is substantially reduced. While similar in spirit, there are also some differences between our and related research [29], [30]. For example, our auto-generated BNs do not have a fixed number of layers. Instead, the number of layers is determined by the how component models are combined according to the structure of the system, see Table V.

VII. COMPILATION TO ARITHMETIC CIRCUIT

We now very briefly summarize the compilation of Bayesian networks to arithmetic circuits (ACs). Compilation is the third stage in our approach to probabilistic model-based diagnosis. Prior to compilation, we modify the BN's CPTs to store pointers to AC nodes rather than numbers. For example, if 0.1 is stored in a CPT slot, then this number would be replaced with a pointer to a single AC node (sink) labeled with 0.1. Also prior to compilation, for each BN variable, we add a new table over just that variable representing the values of that variable. For example, variable X with values 0 and 1 would generate a table over X where the first slot contains a pointer to an AC node (sink) labeled with λ_0 and the second slot contains a pointer to an AC node (sink) labeled with λ_1 .

After these two preprocessing steps, we run a slightly modified version of standard variable elimination (VE) [22], [31]. The only difference occurs when the standard version wishes to add or multiply two numbers. In each of these situations, the standard algorithm will identify two slots A and

B in tables, add (multiply) the two numbers residing there, and store the result back into some slot *C* of some table. When the modified algorithm looks into *A* and *B*, it finds pointers to AC nodes α and β rather than numbers. Instead of performing the arithmetic operation, the modified algorithm creates a new AC node γ labeled with "+" or "*", makes α and β children of γ , and stores a pointer to γ into *C*. Upon completion, standard VE yields a single table containing a single slot containing a number. The modified algorithm will be the same, except that rather than a number, we will have a pointer to an AC node, which is the root of the compiled arithmetic circuit.

By exploiting local structure, this modified VE algorithm can yield an arithmetic circuit that is much smaller than exponential in treewidth. If one pays attention to how the CPTs of the Bayesian network representing EPSs are auto-generated as described in Section VI, it is easy to see that many of these CPTs will be small and deterministic. Arithmetic circuit compilation has been shown to perform well on many such BNs [26], [8], and the ADAPT BN is no exception.

VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We now discuss probabilistic inference experiments based on an ADAPT BN with 503 discrete nodes and 579 edges; related experiments can be found elsewhere [10], [11]. Probabilistic inference is the fourth and final stage in our probabilistic model–based diagnosis approach, and the only one that needs to be performed on-line. In the ADAPT BN, the number of states per node ranges from 2 to 4 with an average of 2.23 and a median of 2. Experimental data are divided into two sets: real-world data from ADAPT and synthetic data automatically generated from the ADAPT BN. For arithmetic circuit evaluation, we used the ACE system to compile an ADAPT BN into an arithmetic circuit and to evaluate that arithmetic circuit (see http://reasoning.cs.ucla.edu/ace/ regarding ACE). The timing measurements reported here were made on a PC with an Intel 4 1.83 GHz processor, 1 GB RAM, and Windows XP.

A. Experiments using Electrical Power System Data

The purpose of the experiment with real-world data was do characterize the diagnostic quality of the ADAPT BN.

1) Design: For experimentation using real-world data, EPS scenarios were generated using the ADAPT EPS at NASA Ames (see https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/). These scenarios, which are summarized in Table VI, cover component failures, sensor failures, and both component and sensor failures. Each scenario contains one, two, or three faults. In order to stresstest our probabilistic reasoner, we did not restrict inserted faults to discrete faults only. We also inserted continuous faults, specifically faults of the form "stuck at x", "noise StdDev = x", or "drift slope = x", with $x \in \mathbb{R}$. Since our probabilistic models do not contain continuous random variables, experiments with continuous faults cannot be diagnosed exactly, but they are still of great interest and included in many of the experiments reported on below.

In each scenario, ADAPT's initial state was as follows: Circuit breakers were commanded closed; the corresponding command variables in E_C were clamped to *cmdClose* in

ID	Faults Inserted in ADAPT	Most Probable Diagnosis - Computed	Match
304	Relay EY260 failed open	Health_relay_ey260_cl = stuckOpen	Yes
305	Relay feedback sensor ESH175 failed open	Health_relay_ey175_cl = stuckOpen	Yes
306	Circuit breaker ISH262 tripped	Health_breaker_ey262_op = stuckOpen	Yes
308	Voltage sensor E261 failed low	Health_e261 = stuckVoltageLo	Yes
309	Battery BATT1 voltage low	Health battery1 = stuckDisabled	Yes
310	Inverter INV1 failed off	Health inv1 = stuckOpen	Yes
311	Light sensor LT500 failed low	Health lt500 = stuckLow	Yes
441	Relay EY160 stuck open	Health relay ey160 cl = stuckOpen	Partly
	Big fan ST515 stuck at 0 RPM		
442	Current sensor IT261 noise StdDev = 5	Health it261 = stuckCurrentHi	Partly
	Relay feedback sensor ESH172 stuck at 0	$Health_esh172 = stuckOpen$	-
	Current sensor IT140 stuck at 100		
443	Current sensor IT281 drift slope = 2	Health_it281 = stuckCurrentHi	Partly
	Relay EY244 stuck closed	Health_relay_ey244_cl = stuckClosed	
	Big fan ST516 stuck at -10 RPM		
445	Voltage sensor E235 stuck at 0.3	Health_e235 = stuckVoltageLo	Partly
	Relay feedback sensor ESH344A stuck closed	Health_relay_ey344_cl = stuckClosed	
	Inverter INV2 failed off	<i>Health_inv2</i> = <i>stuckOpen</i>	
447	Voltage sensor E161 failed low	Health_e161 = stuckVoltageLo	Yes
	Current sensor IT167 failed low	Health_it167 = stuckCurrentLo	
449	Voltage sensor E140 failed low	Health_e140 = stuckVoltageLo	Yes
	Voltage sensor E161 failed low	Health_e161 = stuckVoltageLo	
450	Inverter INV1 failed off	Health_inv1 = stuckOpen	Partly
	Big fan ST515 stuck at 600 RPM	Health_fan1_speed_st515 = stuckMid	
451	Relay EY171 failed open	Health_relay_ey171_cl = stuckOpen	Yes
	Light sensor LT500 failed low	Health_lt500 = stuckLow	
452	Light bulb TE500 failed off	Health_load170_bulb1 = stuckDisabled	Partly
	Temperature sensor TE501 failed low		

TABLE VI

DIAGNOSTIC RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT FAULT SCENARIOS (WITH IDS 304, 305, ...) FOR THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM TESTBED ADAPT.

evidence *e*. Relays were commanded open; the corresponding relay variables in E_C were clamped to *cmdOpen* in *e*. In this initial state, all health nodes H_E are deemed healthy when computing MAP(H_E), MAP_{MPE}(H_E), or MAP_{MLV}(H_E). Continuous sensor readings were discretized before being used for clamping the corresponding discrete random variables E_C in our ADAPT model. To keep the experimental protocol consistent across scenarios, all inserted faults were persisted until the end of the experiments. Diagnostic queries MAP_{MPE}(H_E), for which results are presented in Table VI, were taken towards the end of the scenarios.

2) Results: The results of the experiments with real-world data from ADAPT are summarized in Table VI. Each scenario is presented in one or more rows of the table, along with faults inserted and the diagnostic results computed for queries $MAP_{MPE}(H_E, e)$. Since H_E contains 128 variables, reflecting the health status of 128 EPS components and sensors, we only show the variables found to be non-healthy in Table VI.

3) Discussion: We see in Table VI that the different diagnostic queries correctly diagnose a majority of these component and sensor failure scenarios. In fact, there is an exact match in 10 of the 16 scenarios. Even in cases where there is not exact agreement, the diagnosis is either partly matching or at least reasonable as we will see in the following.

We now discuss in more detail experiments for which an exact match was not obtained. In Experiment 441 in Table VI, both EY160 and ST515 were failed. However, since EY160 is upstream of and controls the power to ST515, the non-performance of ST515 is consistent with the single-fault diagnosis computed by ACE, and in fact has a greater probability than the double faults actually inserted. In other

words, the ST515 failure is masked by the EY160 failure.

Experiments 442 and 443 have continuous faults inserted that are currently beyond the scope of our discrete probabilistic model. In Experiment 442, there are no sensors on the affected load, making it difficult to detect whether (i) the relay has failed open, thus turning off the load, or (ii) the relay feedback sensor has failed open. (Estimating how current varies for varying loads is beyond the scope of our discrete model.) So, if the relay failed open and turned off the attached load there would be a drop in current being drawn from the battery because there are fewer loads. But we are not discretizing the current nodes in this way, sometimes making it difficult to distinguish between relay failure and relay position sensor failure.

In Experiment 443, 2 of the 3 faulty components were correctly isolated in spite of continuous faults being inserted. We now consider the one fault not caught: This fault was inserted in ST516, a fan on Load bank 2, which was not commanded on during this experiment. In other words, the fact that ST516 was neither on nor commanded to be on made the abnormally low sensor reading of -10 RPM harder to detect. Another issue was the discretization in the BN, where the faulty sensor reading of -10 is binned with the correct sensor reading of 0.

In Experiment 445, 2 of the 3 faulty components were correctly isolated, and the only difficulty was due to the continuous fault inserted.

In Experiment 450, two faults were inserted. When the inverter failed, all downstream power was disrupted. So E165, E167, ST165, LT500, IT167 go to low values. But ST515, which should also have gone to a low value (because the fan

does not have power anymore and therefore is not spinning) was stuck reading that its nominal value was around 600, which lead to the partly correct diagnosis *stuckMid*; the diagnosis *Health inv1* = *stuckOpen* is correct.

In Experiment 452, the light sensor LT500 falls from ≈ 43 to ≈ 32 towards the end of the experiment. This lower value of ≈ 32 strongly suggests that only two bulbs are on, in other words that one bulb out of the three bulbs present had failed. Temperature sensor TE500 started falling, indicating that the bulb associated with that sensor was off. Then TE501 went to 0 while the light sensor reading remained the same, indicating that sensor TE501 was likely also faulty. At the time of the diagnosis, we have the following evidence: TE500 reads high (however, its derivative is negative indicating that the bulb is off - but that is not in the discrete model); TE501 reads low; TE502 reads high; and LT500's sensor reading indicates that two bulbs are lit. Thus, based on the evidence provided to our model, it concludes a single fault of stuckDisabled for Bulb 1. This diagnosis of *Health* load 170 bulb 1 = stuckDisabled is a direct result of the TE501 and LT500 readings. However, what was inserted was two faults, for Bulb 0 and TE501. This highlights two issues. First, the discretization does not perfectly capture the signature of a bulb being off. Here, the bulb is still warm from having previously been on, leading the TE500 value to be above the threshold defined for on. A second issue is that temporal aspects are not captured by taking one time slice near end of run; in this case there are temporal clues that point toward the correct diagnosis.

We note that there are several different but related phenomena underlying the mismatches in Table VI. First, and reflecting the challenging nature of the fault scenarios that can be created using ADAPT, continuous faults (as inserted in experiments 441, 442, 443, 445, 448, and 450) are simply beyond the scope of our currently discrete probabilistic model. Second, there is no guarantee that the inserted faults are part of a unique MPE for the given evidence for E_E . There may be multiple most probable explanations, or alternatively, m faults may have been inserted, but one or more explanations with m-1 faults or less turn out to be more probable. For example, three faults may have been inserted into ADAPT, but there is an explanation with two or one faults that has a higher or equal posterior probability. Experiment 441 is a good example of this effect. Third, there are faults that could have been detected had more fine-grained discretizations of random variables been used. Experiments 442 and 452 provides an example of this, since the failure of the temperature sensor TE501 was quite dramatic and indicative of a sensor failure rather than only a failure in the light bulb TE500. A fourth phenomenon is that there might be too few, improperly placed, or inadequate sensors to distinguish between different faults. Many of the mismatches in these experiments could have been detected had more appropriate sensing been used; a detailed discussion of sensing issues including sensor placement is beyond the scope of this article.

In summary, we have observed strong performance for our probabilistic model in these controlled experiments with ADAPT. We also note that a richer way of presenting diagnostic results would be helpful but non-trivial to provide.

Inference	MPE		Marginals	
Time (ms)	VE	ACE	JTP	ACE
Minimum	19.30	0.2235	9.792	0.5721
Maximum	40.21	2.5411	65.34	5.9228
Median	19.81	0.2260	10.52	0.6006
Mean	20.13	0.2625	11.01	0.7854
St. Dev.	1.554	0.2028	4.101	0.6970

TABLE VII Results for different inference algorithms (VE, ACE, and CTP) when computing MPEs and marginals using synthetic data generated from the ADAPT BN.

Specifically, it would be useful to have access to all non-zero explanations and their probabilities, not just the most probable explanation but explanations with lower probabilities. These experimental results also motivate several other future research directions as discussed in Section IX.

B. Experiments using Simulated Data

The goal of the experiment with synthetic data was to understand the performance of arithmetic circuit evaluation versus alternative algorithms, variable elimination and join tree propagation in particular, in the ADAPT setting.

1) Design: In order to better understand the performance of arithmetic circuit evaluation (ACE), we performed comparative experiments with variable elimination (VE) and join tree propagation (JTP). Simulated data was created by a program that (i) generated a set of failure scenarios according to the probabilities of the ADAPT BN's health nodes H_E , and (ii) generated evidence by doing stochastic simulation for each failure scenario. These evidence sets were then used as evidence in the three different inference systems, and inference was performed as presented below.

2) Results: Results from the experiments are summarized in Table VII. Both MPEs and marginals were computed for 200 simulated evidence sets generated from the ADAPT BN.

3) Discussion: The main points, which are in line with previous results on a smaller version of the ADAPT BN [32]. are as follows. On average, ACE is over 76 times faster than VE when computing MPEs (see Table VII). In addition, ACE can compute all marginals, supporting the probabilistic queries BEL(H, e) (where $H \in \mathbf{H}_E$) and MAP_{MLV}(\mathbf{H}_E , e), using just slightly more than twice the time used for computing MPEs, or $MAP_{MPE}(H_E, e)$. In other words, ACE computes probabilities over 500 random variables more than 33 times faster than VE computes probabilities for a single random variable. The third inference system, JTP, can compute all marginals in a manner similar to ACE. This overcomes VE's limitation of computing probabilities for only one random variable at a time. Compared to ACE, however, JTP is over 14 times slower. Finally, the standard deviation is substantially smaller for ACE than for VE and JTP. The fast and predictable inference times of ACE are both very important factors for electrical power system health management in the real-time setting of aerospace.

Parametric structure can also be exploited by VE and JTP algorithms using more sophisticated representations of factors [33, Chapter 13]. However, the overhead associated with

these techniques tends to outweigh the savings, unless the parametric structure is very excessive. The main benefit of using arithmetic circuits is that the overhead is pushed into the compilation phase and is factored out from the run-time process. This particular issue is discussed in some theoretical detail in [33], and there are also experimental results that illustrate this point (see http://www.ics.uci.edu/~csp/uai2006/tutorials#AdnanDarwiche).

That said, it is clear that our approach produces, for ADAPT, a BN that all three systems perform well on. This illustrates that the ADAPT BN was carefully generated, using our novel modelling approach and auto-generation algorithm, in manner that supports efficient inference using three quite different exact inference algorithms.

IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this article, we have discussed an electrical power system application of the probabilistic approach to model-based diagnosis. Specifically, we have discussed the use of Bayesian networks and arithmetic circuits to perform diagnosis and health management in electrical power systems in aircraft and spacecraft. We have emphasized two important issues that arise when developing diagnostic applications in this area, namely the challenges of modelling and real-time reasoning. The modelling challenge concerns how to model a real-world EPS by means of Bayesian networks. To address this challenge, we developed a systematic way of representing electrical power systems as Bayesian networks, supported by an easy-to-use specification language and an auto-generation algorithm. The second challenge, that of real-time reasoning, is associated with the embedding of algorithms that solve computationally hard problems, including diagnostic reasoning, into hard realtime systems [5], [6]. To address this challenge, we compiled Bayesian networks into arithmetic circuits.

While compilation of Bayesian networks to arithmetic circuits is well-established [23], [25], [24], [26], [8], this article further extends the reach of the technology by introducing a high-level EPS specification languages from which Bayesian networks are auto-generated, and showing that the combined approach gives strong experimental results on ADAPT, a realworld EPS.

Future directions of work include the following. First, improved modeling of and reasoning with continuous behavior, using soft evidence, highly discretized, and/or continuous random variables, along with representation using arithmetic circuits for purposes of compilation, would be of great interest. A second area of interest is improved modeling of dynamic, transient, and cascading faults along with their integration into the compilation approach. Third, it would be very useful to extend the high-level specification language and further investigate sensing issues, including the questions of optimal sensor placement as well as the number and types of sensors needed to distinguish between different faults.

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