

#### Monitor Synthesis for Software Health Management

Lee Pike | leepike@galois.com Galois, Inc.

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www.nasa.gov

How do you know your embedded software won't fail?

- Certification (e.g., DO-178B) is largely process-oriented
- Testing exercises a small fraction of the state-space
- It's probably not formally verified
  - Even if so, just a small subsystem
  - And making simplifying assumptions

#### I'll argue: need to detect/respond at runtime

#### Yes, it's Still a Problem

2005-2008:

#### Malaysia Airlines Flight 124 (Boeing 777) "Software anomaly"

- Qantas Airlines Flight 72 (Airbus A330)
   Transient fault in the inertial reference unit
- Space Shuttle STS-124 aborted launch
   Bad assumptions about distributed fault-tolerance



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Just the FaCTS, Ma'am: The Constraints

Runtime monitoring for real-time embedded systems should satisfy the FaCTS:


- Functionality: don't change the target's behavior
- Certifiability: don't require re-certification, or make it easy Don't go changing sources.
- Timing: don't interfere with the target's timing
- SWaP: don't exhaust size, weight, power reserves

# How do we monitor a system without violating these constraints?

#### Outline

- 1. The Copilot language and compiler
- 2. Embedded domain-specific languages
- 3. Low-cost high-assurance
- 4. Pilot-study<sup>1</sup>: injecting software faults in a fault-tolerant airspeed system
- 5. Conclusions

<sup>1</sup>Pun intended



### **Copilot: Embedded System Monitoring**


gcc

#### **Copilot Language**

A simple stream language

- Think: data-flow of infinite lists (streams) LUSTRE
- Streams give a discrete, synchronous view of real-time
- Strongly & statically typed variables with no lossy casts

let x = varW64 "x"  
x .= 
$$[0]$$
 ++ x + 2  
X  $\rightarrow 0$ , 2, 4, 6 ...



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### Copilot Interpreter (In One Slide)

```
interpret copilotVs extVs s =
 case s of
   Const c -> repeat c
   Var v -> getElem v copilotVs
   ExtVar _ v -> checkV v (\langle v' \rangle -> (getElem v' extVs))
   ExtArr _ (v,s') -> checkV v (\langle v' \rangle -> map (\langle i \rangle -> getElem v' extVs
                                                     !! fromIntegral i)
                                                (interpret copilotVs extVs s'))
   Append ls s' -> ls ++ interpret copilotVs extVs s'
   Drop i s' -> drop i $ interpret copilotVs extVs s'
   F f \_ s' \rightarrow map f (interpret copilotVs extVs s')
   F2 f _ s0 s1 -> zipWith f (interpret copilotVs extVs s0)
                                 (interpret copilotVs extVs s1)
   F3 f _ s0 s1 s2 -> zipWith3 f
                         (interpret copilotVs extVs s0)
                         (interpret copilotVs extVs s1)
                         (interpret copilotVs extVs s2)
```


## Point #1: Embedded DSLs Make Things Better

 A domain-specific language (DSL) is a special-purpose programming language.

E.g., sed/awk, Simulink, R

An embedded DSL (eDSL) is a DSL written as a library in a generalpurpose programming language

Often the host language is a functional language, e.g., Haskell, Scheme, OCaml



### Point #1: Embedded DSLs Make Things Better

Why eDSLs?

Lexer, parser, type-checker, etc. for free and more likely correct

Macro language for free (the entire host language)

In eDSLs, the macro language is primary

- Libraries for free
- Much easier to make your own modifications

For Copilot: can we have the advantages of functional languages without suffering its limitations (timing, control-flow, memory size)?

## Point #1: Embedded DSLs (Sometimes!) Make Things Better


#### Why not?

- The DSL syntax must be a "sub-syntax" of your host language
- In some cases, efficiency can be tricky
- More esoteric error messages
- eDSLs in certification unexplored
- Research Harder to make proprietary/closed source topics!


### eDSLs: C'mon, Everybody's Doing It

- Eaton (embedded control systems)
- Ericsson (DSP)
- Credit Suisse and other trading houses (e.g., derivatives pricing)
- Galois (Numerous)

#### Copilot as an eDSL



#### The Power of eDSLs



"If the majority of the three engine temperature probes has exceeded 250 degrees, then the cooler is engaged and remains engaged until the temperature of the majority of the probes drop to 250 degrees or less. Otherwise, trigger an immediate shutdown of the engine."

> approx. 800LoCs of C

Who watches the watchmen? Some lessons:


- Types are free proofs
- (Try) to avoid compiler bugs/non-standard behavior
- Compile -Wall, compile -Wall, compile -Wall
- Ensure interpreter == compiler
- Ensure interpreter == compiler, millions of times
- Test coverage (line, branch, functional call) using gcov

#### Point #2: Low-Cost High-Assurance

Prove memory-safety.

CBMC http://www.cprover.org/cbmc/

 Verify the compilation – a "poor man's verifying compiler") (future work)



#### Interlude: Pitot Failures





Reliability of the air pressure sensors made by both Thales and Goodr particular prominence after the 2009 crash of an Air France Airbus A: Dio de Janeiro to Daris that claimed 228 victime Ditot Tubes are susni

#### Article Discussion Air Data Inertial Reference Unit WikipediA The Free Encyclopedia An Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) is a key component Main page

#### Failures and directives

#### FAA Airworthiness directive 2000-07-27

On May 3, 2000, the FAA issued airworthiness directive 2000-07-27, addres Boeing 737, 757, Airbus A319, A320, A321, A330, and A340 models. [2][10][:

#### Airworthiness directive 2003-26-03

On 27 January 2004 the FAA issued airworthiness directive 2003-26-03 (lat

#### Alitalia A-320

On 25 June 2005, an Alitalia Airbus A320-200 registered as I-BIKE departer failed, leaving only one operable. In the subsequent confusion the third was

#### Malaysia Airlines Flight 124

On 1 August 2005 a serious incident involving Malaysia Airlines Flight 124, aircraft acting on false indications.<sup>[14]</sup> In that incident the incorrect data imp with the stall warning activated. The pilots recovered the aircraft with the air

#### Interlude: Pitot Failures


Failures cited in


- Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 6231 (1974)---3 killed Increased climb/speed until uncontrollable stall
- Birgenair Flight 301, Boeing 757 (1996)---189 killed
  - One of three pitot tubes blocked; faulty air speed indicator
- Aeroperú Flight 603, Boeing 757 (1996)---70 killed
   Tape left on the static port(!) gave erratic data
- Líneas Aèreas Flight 2553, Douglas DC-9 (1997)---74 killed
  - Freezing caused spurious low reading, compounded with a failed alarm system
  - Speed increased beyond the plane's capabilities
- Air France Flight 447, Airbus A330 (2009)---228 killed
  - Airspeed "unclear" to pilots
  - Still under investigation

. . .


#### **Test Bed**

- Representative of fault-tolerant systems
- 4 X STM32 microcontrollers
- ARM Cortex M3 cores clocked at 72 Mhz
- 5 differential pressure sensors
  - Senses dynamic and static pitot tube pressure
  - Pitot tubes measure airspeed
- Designed to fit UAS (unpiloted air system)
   Size, power, weight,...





#### Aircraft Configuration Edge 540T-R2





#### **Copilot Monitors**

#### Introduced **software faults** to be caught by Copilot monitors:

- Abrupt airspeed change: airspeed  $\Delta > 12$  m/s
- Fault-management assumptions
  - Fault-management used the Boyer-Moore majority vote algorithm
  - Check agreement between the voted values
     Uses coordinating distributed monitors
- Subsequent flights:
  - Ground-station communication protocol
  - Other sensors

## Monitoring Results


- Monitoring approach did not disrupt the FaCTS properties of the observed system
  - Under ~100 C expressions per monitor
  - Binaries on the order of 10k
- Monitoring via sampling works for periodic tasks
- Simulated mode change
- Next time: didn't think to monitor for a taped pitot tube!




#### Future Work Test-Bed

In collaboration with Portland State University

- ArduPilot autopilot (open source)
- Altitude hold (barometer & sonar)
- Position hold (GPS magnometer)
- Collision avoidance (infrared)
- Stabilization (gyroscope)
- Battery monitoring







to prove a bunch of memory safety properties of the generated program.

- The steering problem (mode change) Right now: escape to raw C
- Timing analysis: to monitor property p, need to sample at rate r
  - E.g., state-based properties
- Security monitoring for embedded systems
   Tech transfer to AFRL

#### Conclusions

Problem space: hard real-time embedded C

- The FaCTS: Functionality, Certifiability, Timing, SWaP
- Approach: monitoring by periodic sampling

The eDSL approach

A path to fast, reliable compilers and languages

Nobody watches the watchmen
 Prove/test/verify your compiler is correct

#### Thanks

- Dr. Ben Di Vito
- NASA Langley's Formal Methods Group
- NASA Langley's AirSTAR Rapid Evaluation and Prototyping Group




# Appendix

## Monitoring By Sampling

Without inlining monitors, we must sample:

- Property (011)\*
- False positive (monitor misses an fault):
  - Values are 0111011 but sampling 011011
- False negative (monitor signals a fault that didn't occur):
  - Values are 011011 but sampling 0111011
- Observation: with fixed periodic schedule and shared clock
  - False negatives impossible
    - We don't want to re-steer an unbroken system
  - False positives possible, but requires constrained misbehavior




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
#### Pitot Data

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- Gui
- --> Lustre
- Scheduling on ARINC 653
- Rushby: Liam(sp? flight) the control sampling/smoothing data
- Overflow vars monitoring
- Ievel C system level A monitor -- DO178B




#### **Timed Semantics**



Copilot ensures synchronization between streams


 Assuming synchronization of phases in distributed systems: no nonfaulty processor reaches the start of phase *p*+1 until every non-faulty processor has started phase *p*

#### **Timed Semantics**



Copilot ensures synchronization between streams


 Assuming synchronization of phases in distributed systems: no nonfaulty processor reaches the start of phase *p*+1 until every non-faulty processor has started phase *p*



Stream Semantics (Drop)

x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ... y = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ... Stream Semantics (Drop)

x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ... y = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ...



Design goal: make memory usage constant and "obvious" to the programmer


- No anonymous streams
  - Compiler doesn't have to worry about sharing
- No lazily-computed values

• E.g. 
$$x = [0] + x + 1$$

y .= drop 2 x


- Other restrictions (see paper)
- Upshot: "WYSIWYG memory usage"
  - Memory constrained by number of streams
  - Memory for each stream is essentially the LHS of ++
  - Doesn't include stack variables

#### **Timing Info & Expression Counts**



#### **Example Copilot Specification**

"If the temperature rises more than 2.3 degrees within 2 seconds, then the engine has been shut off." (period == 1 sec)



#### Usage

- compile spec "c-name" [opts] baseOpts
- interpret spec rounds [opts] baseOpts
- test rounds [opts] baseOpts
  - quickChecking the compiler/interpreter
- verify filepath int
  - SAT solving on the generated C program
- help (commands and options)
- [spec] (parser)
- Opts (incomplete list):
  - C trigger functions
  - Ad-hoc C code (library included for writing this)
  - Hardware clock
  - Verbosity
  - GCC options

### Runtime Monitoring: What's New?

Not new:


- One-out-of-two systems
- Error-checking codes
- Distributed fault-tolerance
- Built-in test
- New(er) ideas:
  - Domain-specific languages for monitoring
  - High-assurance monitors
  - SW as a system component

Decompose monitoring and controlling



#### Types

- Types: Int & Word (8, 16, 32, 64), Float, Double
- Each stream has a unique inferred type:



- Casting
  - Implicit casting is a type-error Won't compile
  - Explicit casting guarantees:
    - signs never lost (no Int --> Word casts)
    - No overflow (no cast to a smaller width)

Some problems for conventional compilers go away
Don't have to add new language features (often)
Don't need scripting languages

E.g., compiling distributed monitors is just another function:

compile program node
 (setCode (Just header)) baseOpts

distCompile program node headers =
 compile (program node) node
 (setCode (Just (headers node))) baseOpts

# Real-Time Runtime Monitoring

Lee Pike | **Galois, Inc.** | leepike@galois.com joint work with Alwyn Goodloe NASA Langley Research Center Robin Morisset École Normale Supérieure Sebastian Niller National Institute of Aerospace Nis Wegmann Technical University of Denmark



